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Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law. By
Ran Hirschl. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 320 pp. $45.00 cloth.
Reviewed by Benjamin L. Berger, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University

As the epigraph to one chapter in his impressive volume,
Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law, Ran
Hirschl offers the following exchange between the archaeologist Howard
Carter and his patron, Lord Carnarvon, on Carter’s entry into
Tutankhamun’s tomb: “Can you see anything?” “Yes, wonderful
things!” The epigraph might aptly frame the volume as a whole.
Hirschl’s ambition is to seize a pivotal moment in the development of
comparative constitutional scholarship and to help those engaged in the
field to see more and better. There is a tone of excitement and affection
in the pages, born of the recent and rapid global spread of
constitutionalism and judicial review, which has been accompanied by a
marked growth in scholarly – and juridical – interest in comparative
constitutional study. Hirschl sees the scholarly possibilities attendant on
such a moment and regards the comparative constitutional enterprise as
poised to enrich our understanding of modern constitutional life.
And this enthusiastic tone is accompanied by one of concern
because, as Hirschl sees it, the field of comparative constitutional study is
currently afflicted by “a fuzzy and rather incoherent epistemological and
methodological matrix” (5), a shortfall in self-understanding that
prevents the scholarly enterprise from realizing its potential. In
particular, the range and variety of approaches that are collected under
the mantle of comparative constitutional study has deprived us of a clear
view of what the character of the “comparative” project is and ought to
be, and of a refined sense of what methods are well calibrated to its ends.
In this volume, Hirschl seeks to address this weakness by drawing the
reader through the contemporary quandaries and intellectual history of
comparative constitutional inquiry and charting out a kind of
methodological desiderata for the field.

Indeed, the heart of Comparative Matters is a plea for comparative
constitutional study to be more energetically and resolutely
interdisciplinary, engaging, in particular, with the social sciences and
empirical methods. The latter half of Hirschl’s book is dedicated to this
methodological call, with Chapter 4 urging a shift from comparative
constitutional “law” to comparative constitutional “studies,” signalling
an enterprise more closely tied to the contextual focus of the social
sciences and less anchored to conventional forms of legal analysis. One
need not wholly concur with Hirschl that the style of constitutional
reflection in the legal academy is quite so thin on such social and political
framing to nevertheless profit from his account of why deeper
engagement with the social sciences and its methods would enrich the
field of comparative constitutional study. In Chapter 5 and 6 Hirschl
examines key methodological tensions that must be reckoned with for
the field to continue to develop (the universal v. particular and critiques
from the “global south”) and offers a set of principles and
methodological rules. In these latter pages, Hirschl sets out principles of
case selection in small-N comparative studies and advocates for the
greater use of large-N empirical studies. Hirschl is not sanguine about
such studies, carefully noting the limits and risks involved. But he is
insistent that research method must be calibrated to research aim and
that if one aspires to meaningful causal claims or explanatory theories,
such well-crafted studies are important arrows in the comparative
constitutionalist’s quiver.
The force of these methodological arguments rests, however, on
the work that Hirschl does in the first half of the book. The first three
chapters, each fascinating and erudite, appear vastly different in their
focus and character. Chapter 1 addresses the currently salient issue of
top courts citing the constitutional jurisprudence of foreign countries.
Hirschl offers a helpful and extensive review of the practice, complete
with an illuminating case study of Israel. Chapter 2 turns to “premodern religion law” and explores the ways in which religious
communities managed engagement with the constitutive laws of societies
in which they lived or came into contact, presenting these examples as
early instances of comparative constitutional engagement. In Chapter 3,
the reader is given an intellectual history of comparative constitutional
inquiry, reaching back to the mid-16th century and Jean Bodin, and

galloping forward through thinkers like Selden, Montesquieu, Bolívar,
arriving at a comparison between contemporary Canadian and US
juridical practices.
What unites these apparently divergent chapters is their common
insistence that a court’s, community’s, scholar’s, or polity’s practices of
comparative constitutional inquiry are motivated and shaped by forces
that lie outside of the purely legal. Patterns in the judicial citation of
foreign law, Hirschl argues, are more about the politics of identity
construction than divergences on legal principle. The deep history of
comparative constitutional law revealed in the lives of religious
communities shows that feelings of vulnerability or security, social and
economic needs, political economy, and practical exigency are the chief
determinants of adaptation to and borrowing from the constitutive law of
others. And, in Hirschl’s hands, the intellectual history yields the lesson
that comparative constitutional reflection is driven by a trio of
motivations: necessity, inquisitiveness, and politics. Although not cast in
this manner, I read these chapters as jointly exposing and disrupting the
pathologies of formalism, presentism, and parochialism that afflict too
much comparative constitutional work. As he insistently pushes us into
the theological, the social, the historical, and the political to understand
the nature of constitutional comparison, Hirschl establishes his case that
a genuinely interdisciplinary approach is not just appealing but
imperative. Having been so pushed, where can we turn for richer
understanding but to the social sciences (and, I would add, humanities)?
Recall Hirschl’s complaint about the current epistemological and
methodological foundations for the field.
By enriching the
epistemological terrain for understanding comparative constitutional
practices in the first part of the book, Hirschl establishes the case for his
methodological ambitions.
Comparative Matters leaves us at the threshold of certain important
issues of (appropriately) both an epistemological and methodological
nature. In his desire to shine a light on the social, economic, and political
factors that influence practices of comparative constitutionalism, Hirschl
tends to narrow and ossify concepts that those working in socio-legal
studies might prefer to expand and destabilize. For example, having
explained the various political factors that influence judicial choices to

cite foreign constitutional law, Hirschl concludes that “[t]hese choices are
sociopolitical, not juridical” (43). Similarly, the destination of his
intellectual journey through comparative law is the statement that
“ultimately attitudes toward the ‘laws of others’ reflect social processes,
political ideologies, and national meta-narratives that are broader than
the constitutional sphere itself” (13). Seeing the perduring influence of
social, political, and identity-based factors on comparative constitutional
practice, perhaps the more constructive move would be to expand our
sense of the juridical task (as one always involving decisions about
community identity) and of what is encompassed by the “constitutional
sphere”. Methodologically, as Comparative Matters moves into its final
chapters, the range of the imagined interdisciplinarity seems to narrow,
focussing on empirical social sciences and leaving aside Hirschl’s own
earlier and illuminating engagement with theology, philosophy, and
literature evident and so fruitful in the early chapters of this book. The
choice is understandable, given the less mature state of scholarship that
takes seriously case selection and large-N research design principles; and
yet one can hope that Hirschl’s book will inspire a similarly careful
consideration of the methodological rules and approaches appropriate to
the humanistic engagement with comparative constitutionalism.
Comparative Matters is an ambitious, learned, and provocative
book that succeeds in contributing to a more sound and productive
foundation for the field of comparative constitutional studies. With this
volume, Hirschl again marshals his impressive range and vision as a
scholar 1 to advance our understanding of constitutionalism and, this
time, to help us to think more deeply about the character of the
comparative constitutional enterprise. Otherwise put, as a comparative
constitutionalist, this book will help you to see “wonderful things.”

See, e.g., his earlier volumes, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the
New Constitutionalism (Harvard, 2004), and Constitutional Theocracy (Harvard, 2010).
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